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I. INTRODUCTION
[O]n the one hand there is increasing recognition of the stature of tribal courts,
but on the other hand there is the companion development which seems to bring
tribal courts more directly into the orbit of federal review. Or to say it another
way, the more important tribal courts become, particularly in their authority
over non-Indians, the more need there seems to be for increasing federal
scrutiny.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. I would like to thank Professors Laurie
Reynolds and Alex Tallchief Skibine for their comments, and Taiawagi Helton for his research
assistance. Copyright C 1997 by Judith V. Royster. Used by permission of Judith V. Royster.
I. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAw AND CONTEMPORARY
TRIBAL LIFE 95 (1995). Professor Pommersheim noted this developing paradox in the federal law
reaction to tribal courts.
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In 1996, the Tenth Circuit handed down its decision in Mustang
Production Co. v. Harrison.2 The first time I read it, I thought it was a
good decision. The court held that Indian tribes retain the inherent
sovereign power to tax throughout their Indian country, including all trust
allotments.3 Accordingly, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes possessed the
governmental authority to impose a severance tax on non-Indian
companies extracting oil and gas from allotments held in trust for
members of the Tribes.4 The court's decision seemed correct on the
substantive law and protective of tribal sovereignty. All in all, it seemed
like a good decision.
Then I read it again. This time I noticed the procedural background
of the case. Mustang originally filed a challenge to the tribal taxes in
federal district court.5 On motion of the Tribes, the federal court stayed
the action pending exhaustion of tribal remedies.6 Mustang then filed suit
in Cheyenne-Arapaho District Court, which granted summary judgment
to the Tribes.7  On appeal, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Supreme Court
affirmed! Mustang sought review in federal district court, which
determined that the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes properly exercised their
jurisdiction to tax the lessees.9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.'0 But I
recalled this statement of the Supreme Court of the United States in Iowa
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante:" "Unless a federal court determines
that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, however, proper deference to the
tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by the
[plaintiff's] claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts."' 2
So I read Mustang Production a third time. Sure enough, the federal
courts had said nothing about the authority of the Cheyenne-Arapaho
2. 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
3. See id. at 1385.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1384.
6. See id.
7. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6095, 6096
(Chey.-Arap. D. Ct. 1991). Initially, Mustang filed an administrative appeal with the Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tax Commission, which ruled that, as an administrative agency, it had no jurisdiction to
determine the validity of an act it was charged with enforcing. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6058, 6060 (Chey.-Arap. S. Ct. 1993) (citing Mustang
Prod. Co. v. Combs, No. 89-005 (Chey.-Arap. Tax Comm'n, June 14, 1989)).
8. See Mustang Fuel, 21 Indian L. Rep. at 6065.
9. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995, 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1995), affd sub
nom. Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288
(1997).
10. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
11. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
12. Id. at 19.
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courts to hear Mustang's lawsuit. The judicial authority of the Tribes
apparently was not even raised as an issue in the federal courts. Instead,
the federal courts proceeded directly to the merits of the case, relitigating
the substantive determinations of the tribal courts.
Now I was puzzled. At no time did the federal courts determine that
the tribal courts lacked authority to hear the lawsuit. In fact, according
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Strate v. A-i Contractors,3 by
holding that the Tribes possessed the legislative authority to impose the
tax on Mustang, the federal courts implicitly determined that the Tribes
also possessed the adjudicatory authority to hear the lawsuit. 4 So why
was it that the federal courts could relitigate the issues raised by the
lawsuit and resolved by the Cheyenne-Arapaho courts? Didn't Iowa
Mutual prohibit exactly that review? This Article attempts to answer
these questions.
Any answer must begin with the exhaustion doctrine. In National
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,5 the Supreme
Court created an exhaustion rule for federal cases raising issues of tribal
court jurisdiction. 6 The doctrine states that in order to support the
congressional policy of tribal self-government, to encourage the "orderly
administration of justice," and to promote the expertise of tribal courts,' 7
lawsuits that properly invoke federal jurisdiction" may be dismissed or
held in abeyance pending the exhaustion of tribal remedies. 9 Although
the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of comity and not jurisdictional,2" most
federal courts require exhaustion as a matter of course whenever there is
a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction over a lawsuit.2' Once all available
13. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
14. The Court in A-I held that a tribe's judicial power over non-Indian litigants is coterminous
with the tribe's legislative and regulatory power over those non-Indians. See id. at 1413. It thus ap-
pears that if a federal court holds that a tribe has either judicial or legislative/regulatory power in an
area, the court in fact holds that the tribe has both. See id. A-I is discussed in more detail infra
notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
15. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
16. See id. at 856-57.
17. See id
18. National Farmers was a federal question case. See id. at 852-53. Two years later the Court
extended the exhaustion doctrine to diversity cases. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S.
9, 17-20 (1987).
19. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57. Whether the federal district court dismisses or
stays pending tribal court exhaustion is within the federal court's discretion. See id. at 857.
20. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 n.8.
21. See id; see also Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (en
banc). For a circuit-by-circuit analysis of exhaustion requirements, see Timothy W. Joranko,
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual:
Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REV.
259, 268-87 (1993).
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tribal remedies have been exhausted, the losing party retains the right to
seek review in federal court."
In its most recent decision on tribal courts, the Supreme Court may have undercut this approach.
In A-, the Court held that the courts of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
did not have jurisdiction over a lawsuit between two nonmembers arising out of a vehicle accident
on a state highway running through the reservation. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404,
1413 (1997). Because the Court held that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction was co-extensive with tribal
regulatory jurisdiction, it applied the tests for regulatory authority set forth in Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), to determine tribal court jurisdiction. See A-I, 117 S. Ct. at 1413.
Under Montana, tribes are generally divested of regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember activities
on non-Indian fee lands unless the nonmembers have entered into consensual relationships with the
tribes or their members, or unless the activities impact tribal sovereign interests such as health and
welfare, political integrity, or economic security. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. Applying
Montana to the lawsuit at issue in A-I, the Court found that the defendant had not entered into any
consensual relationships with the tribes or their members and that neither adjudicatory nor regulatory
authority over traffic accidents between nonmembers on state highways was necessary to preserve
tribal sovereign interests. See A-I, 117 S. Ct. at 1415-16.
It is the final footnote of A-I that appears to undercut the exhaustion rule. The Court stated:
When, as in this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal govemance
of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evi-
dent that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such conduct
... . Therefore, when tribal-court jurisdiction over an action such as this one is
challenged in federal court, the otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement must give
way, for it would serve no purpose other than delay.
Id. at 1416 n.14 (citations omitted). Footnote 14 cannot be taken literally. The only way in which
it is "evident" that a tribal court lacks jurisdiction over a cause of action arising in Indian country
is if that determination is made under the applicable federal law. And that issue of jurisdiction is
precisely what the exhaustion doctrine is intended to leave, in the first instance, to the tribal rather
than the federal courts. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 & n.21; cf Espil v. Sells, 847 F.
Supp. 752, 758 n.3 (D. Ariz. 1994) (noting the same problems with the "patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions" exception to the exhaustion rule).
In order not to entirely overwhelm the exhaustion rule, footnote 14 must be confined to the facts
of A-L. Under the ruling of A-1, it is "evident" that a tribal court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims arising from a traffic accident on a state highway when all parties to the lawsuit are
nonmembers of the tribe. See A-I, 117 S. Ct. at 1413. In all other instances that raise a colorable
claim of tribal jurisdiction, the exhaustion rule should prevail. But see Wilson v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over state highway accident
claim between member and nonmember).
22. This right of federal court review should not apply to those categories of lawsuits within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts. Exclusive tribal jurisdiction lies in cases arising on the
reservation if both litigants are tribal members or if the lawsuit is brought against a tribal member.
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 382 (1976) (adoption proceeding involving only tribal
members); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (collection action by a non-Indian reservation
business against a tribal member). See generally Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country:
The Confusing Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539,
544-50 (1997). Although both Fisher and Williams v. Lee involved determinations that tribal court
jurisdiction was exclusive of the state courts, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that federal
adjudication of these lawsuits would infringe on tribal sovereignty to the same extent that state
adjudication would. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16; see also Littell v, Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 488-89
(9th Cir. 1965).
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The exhaustion doctrine is well-established in federal Indian law, but
it is highly complex and surprisingly unsettled in its details. As a result,
the exhaustion doctrine has received extensive attention from both courts
and scholars.23 However, the post-exhaustion review process has received
relatively little attention, and yet the issues inherent in post-exhaustion
review are crucial ones if tribal exhaustion is to mean anything other than
delay and additional expense for the litigants.
This Article examines the central issues of post-exhaustion review.
Two specific issues exist within the overriding issue of the scope of post-
exhaustion review in federal courts. First, what standard of review
should the federal courts employ in reviewing tribal court determinations?
And second, what exactly are the federal courts entitled to review once
tribal remedies have been exhausted?
The issue of differentiating between tribal law and federal law
underlies these questions on the scope of post-exhaustion review. As this
Article demonstrates, the existing standard of review between the two
varies dramatically: tribal court determinations of tribal law are entitled
to absolute deference while tribal court determinations of federal law are
generally entitled to none.24 Similarly, this Article contends that although
federal courts may redetermine at least some issues of federal law on
post-exhaustion review, proper respect for tribal courts and legislatures
mandates that federal courts not review issues of tribal law.25
Because of the vast gulf between federal court treatment of federal law
and tribal law, this Article argues that proper deference to the sovereign
powers of Indian tribes and tribal courts requires the federal courts, on
post-exhaustion review, to scrupulously distinguish tribal court rulings on
tribal law from rulings on federal law. Given that the federal courts have
apparently taken de novo review powers over all questions of federal law
In addition, actions brought pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are primarily within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1303 (1994) [hereinafter ICRA]. In those cases, involving allegations that the tribal
government violated an individual's statutory rights under ICRA, the federal courts retain no review
power except that of habeas corpus in instances where the tribal court defendant is in custody. See
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Professor Laurence has written extensively
on the Martinez case and the issue of federal court review. See, e.g., Robert Laurence, A
Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 307 (1991-92); Robert
Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L.
REv. 657 (1992); Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 411 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Joranko, supra note 21; Melissa Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries
Between Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 705 (1997); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of
Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1091 (1995).
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
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decided by tribal courts,26 tribal courts are in danger of serving merely as
preliminary factfinders for federal district courts. This Article thus
proposes that federal courts can preserve the rights and values of tribal
courts as instruments of tribal self-government only by carefully limiting
questions of federal law to appropriate issues. 7
II. DISTINGUISHING TRIBAL FROM FEDERAL LAW
The foundational issue in post-exhaustion review is how-or how
well-the federal courts distinguish questions of federal law from
questions of tribal law. Although some clear areas exist, federal courts
encounter the greatest difficulty with tribal court rulings in cases
involving non-Indian litigants.
Certainly tribal laws are not federal laws. "[T]he mere fact that a
claim is based upon a tribal ordinance consequently does not give rise to
federal question jurisdiction.""8 Instead, tribal law-the development,
interpretation, and application of tribal constitutions, statutes, common
law, and customs-is a matter outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.2 9
26. See infra Part IV.B.2.
27. At this point a disclaimer is in order. I believe that the current post-exhaustion review
standards in the federal courts are seriously misplaced. True respect for tribal courts, for the
development of tribal law and legal institutions, and for the federal policy of tribal self-government
requires the federal courts to forego further jurisdiction upon finding that tribal court jurisdiction over
a lawsuit is proper. Accordingly, I think that the current federal court standard of de novo review
for federal law questions decided by tribal courts, as well as the current federal court practice of
reviewing all tribal rulings on federal law and not just those going to the tribal court's jurisdiction
to decide the case, are wrong under National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.
Nonetheless, the standard and the practice are already well-established. The de novo standard for
federal questions has now been expressly adopted by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the three
circuits that decide the vast majority of Indian law cases. See infra Part III.C. It was also implicitly
adopted by the Supreme Court in A-). See infra Part IlI.C. Similarly, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits all engage in post-exhaustion review of the merits of federal questions other than tribal court
jurisdiction. See infra Part IV.B.2. Both problems, in other words, are essentially done deals.
Given that reality, I have chosen to focus here not on what is wrong with the existing law (and,
as noted, I think a great deal is), but rather on what happens next. My primary concern is that if the
federal courts continue on their present track, post-exhaustion review may entirely overwhelm any
real decision-making power of the tribal courts in any case in which the parties have a basis for
federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Article accepts the post-exhaustion jurisprudence as it presently
exists and proposes limits on any further extension of federal court review in order to give effect to
Iowa Mutuars admonition that ifa federal court affirms tribal court jurisdiction, it is precluded from
relitigating the merits. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19.
28. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1476 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896) (holding that interpretation of tribal law is
solely within the competence of the tribal courts); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth.,
719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiffs stated no federal claim for relief because
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If tribal courts are to have the "vital role in tribal self-government" that
the Supreme Court has envisioned,3° then the tribes' ability to develop
and interpret this body of tribal law must be protected. As Professor
Pommersheim notes, "Tribal courts do not exist solely to reproduce or
replicate the dominant canon appearing in state and federal courts. If
they did, the process of colonization would be complete and the unique
legal cultures of the tribes fully extirpated.' Instead, it is the distinctive
legal principles derived from tribal law and applied in the tribal courts
that both justify and distinguish a separate tribal court jurisprudence.
The sources of tribal law include the tribe's treaties and agreements,
tribal law codified in the form of constitutions and statutes, and published
decisions of the tribal courts.32 Beyond these textual sources, however,
lies the special nature of tribal law: tribal custom and tradition.33 The
use of tribal custom in the development of tribal common law incorpo-
rates tribal beliefs and values into tribal court decision-making.34
Although a tribal court decision based on tribal custom may result in an
opinion identical to one reached under state or federal law,35 the
"fundamentally different view" inherent in tribal custom may also
produce results that vary from state and federal outcomes.36 For example,
Professor Valencia-Weber has identified certain differences in tribal tort
law: Tribal law may apply a standard of "carelessness" rather than the
state law standard of "negligence," and tribal custom may not recognize
certain state-law concepts such as contributory or comparative negli-
gence.37 In any given tort case, then, application of the tribal law
standards may or may not reach results consistent with those reached
under state law.
"this case involves a genuine issue of tribal ordinance construction which must be left to the tribal
court for resolution").
30. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978)
("[T]ribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting significant tribal interests.").
3 1. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 411, 420; cf Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty
Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235, 238 (1997) (arguing that although tribal courts modeled on Anglo-
American courts may strengthen tribes' sovereign capacities to resolve disputes, they nonetheless
ultimately undermine sovereignty by contributing to the assimilation of tribes into American society).
32. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 85.
33. See id. See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law,
24 N.M. L. REv. 225 (1994); James W. Zion, Harmony Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts,
45 MONT. L. REv. 265 (1984).
34. See Zion, supra note 33, at 275.
35. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 33, at 250.
36. See id. at 254.
37. See id. at 255-56; see also Zion, supra note 33, at 277-79 (discussing the development of
tort law in the tribal courts).
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There is thus for each tribe a unique body of tribal law, incorporating
both textual and traditional sources, that is distinct from federal or state
law. The development and protection of this tribal law are important
aspects of tribal self-government."
As a tribe works to identify and develop a body of law that reflects the
values and beliefs of the tribe, that law-whether legislative, regulatory,
procedural, or decisional-is applied to tribal members and nonmembers
of the tribe. The next question, then, is whether that extension of tribal
law to particular categories of persons raises issues of tribal law, federal
law, or both.
In the absence of a federal statute or treaty provision to the contrary,
the question of whether tribes may extend tribal law to tribal members is
solely a matter of tribal law and does not implicate any federal con-
cerns. 9 Tribes generally have full civil jurisdiction over their members
within their Indian country, including not only the sovereign authority to
legislate and regulate,40 but the power to adjudicate disputes as well.4 '
But the question of whether tribes may extend their civil laws to
nontribal members is more complicated. Whether a tribe possesses the
sovereign authority to legislate for and regulate nonmembers is a question
of federal law. The Supreme Court has assumed in case after case that
federal question jurisdiction exists over challenges to a tribe's power to
apply its regulatory laws to nonmembers.42 Lower federal courts have
made that implicit holding explicit, ruling that a tribe's ability to extend
its substantive law to nonmembers is a question of federal law. 3
Similarly, the Supreme Court has expressly held that the question of
whether a tribal court may exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over a
nonmember party is a federal law issue.4 In fact, most recently the
38. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 33, at 260.
39. See, e.g., Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In the
overwhelming majority of instances, a tribe's enforcement of its ordinances against its members will
raise no federal questions at all."); Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th
Cir. 1981) (finding no federal question in the allegation by an Indian plaintiff that tribal election
violated tribal law).
40. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
445 (Stevens, J.), 460 (Blackmun, J.) (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-64
(1981).
41. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1976); Ware v. Richardson, 347
F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (finding claim by Kiowa members against Kiowa Housing
Authority was "an intratribal dispute and as such without the Court's jurisdiction").
42. See, e.g., Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425-26; Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-66.
43. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1995); Native
Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631,634 (9th Cir. 1992); Morongo Band of Mission Indians
v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1990); Chilkat Indian Village, 870 F.2d at 1474-75; Superior
Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986).
44. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
[Vol. 46
POST-EXHAUSTION REVIEW
Court has held that the federal law question of a tribe's legislative or
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers and the federal law question of
a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction are functionally the same federal
question.45 The Court specifically found that, as to tribal sovereign
authority over nonmembers, "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction."46
A tribe's extension of its jurisdiction to nonmembers thus involves both
federal and tribal law issues. Whether the tribe has the sovereign
authority to bring nonmembers within its judicial, legislative, or
regulatory jurisdiction is a question of federal law. If that federal law
question is answered affirmatively, however, the actual application of
tribal statutes, regulations, or decisional law to the nonmembers is solely
a matter of tribal law and does not raise a federal question.47
For example, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation,4" the Court held that the Yakama Nation49 retained, as a
matter of federal law, the sovereign right to zone all lands, including
lands owned in fee by nonmembers, within the "closed" area of the
reservation.5" Once the tribe's zoning authority has been confirmed under
federal law, then the application of the Yakama zoning laws to nonmem-
ber land owners in the closed area should be purely a matter of tribal law.
That is, the uses that the zoning law does or does not permit, and
therefore the uses that the nonmember owners may make of their fee
lands, are matters of tribal law for the tribal legislature or zoning board,
or, if a dispute arises, the tribal court. No federal question is raised by
the tribe's interpretation and application of its zoning laws.
A similar situation arises under the Williams v. Lee5 analysis. In
Williams, the Court held that state courts did not have jurisdiction over
a lawsuit between an Indian defendant and a non-Indian plaintiff arising
out of a transaction that occurred on the reservation." Exclusive
45. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
46. Id.
47. Tribes may, of course, seek to enforce federal law rights against nonmembers as well. In
those cases, the application and enforcement of the law will raise federal questions and may be
litigated in federal court. See, e.g., Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d
548, 553 (9th Cir. 1991). Similarly, tribal claims to possessory rights in property under treaties,
statutes, and federal Indian common law raise federal questions. See, e.g., County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,234-35 (1985); Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United
States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791,
799-800 (D. Idaho 1994).
48. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
49. The Yakama Nation officially changed the spelling from "Yakima" in 1994. See
"Yakamas" Alter Spelling of Tribe, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at B2.
50. See id. at 434 (Stevens, J.).
51. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
52. See id. at 223.
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jurisdiction, the Court determined, belonged to the tribal court.53 By
holding that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the lawsuit,
the Court necessarily contemplated that the merits of the law-
suit-whether the non-Indian plaintiff could collect a debt that the Navajo
defendants allegedly owed-would be determined under Navajo law. In
a case in which the state court has no jurisdiction, on the ground that
state court jurisdiction would infringe on tribal self-government, 54 state
substantive law is manifestly inapplicable. Tribal law must control the
substantive determination of the tribal lawsuit.
In the process, of course, the Court approved the application of tribal
substantive law to the resolution of disputes between Indians and non-
Indians in tribal court. The Court noted that proper respect for tribal
sovereignty demanded that a lawsuit against a tribal member for a cause
of action arising in Indian country be within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribal court.55 In order to preserve the right of the tribe "to make its
own laws and be ruled by them,"56 the Indian defendant could only be
subject to tribal court jurisdiction. And thus, as noted, the Indian
defendant could only be subject to tribal substantive law. But it is
impossible to apply tribal law to the Indian defendant without also
applying tribal law to the non-Indian plaintiff. The Court thus necessarily
determined that a nonmember plaintiff in the Williams v. Lee situation is
subject to both tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction and tribal decisional
law. 5
7
Thus, the right of the non-Indian to collect on the debt would be
determined under tribal law. If the tribal court ruled against the non-
Indian plaintiff, the creditor could not seek review in federal court under
a federal question theory. Once the sovereign right of the tribe to extend
its laws to nonmembers is established as a matter of federal law, as it was
in Williams v. Lee, only tribal law determinations remain in the resolution
of the lawsuit.
Tribal court adjudications involving nonmember parties are thus messy
affairs. Any given case may raise the issue of whether tribal court
53. See id.
54. See id. at 218-20. The Court also remarked at several points in the opinion that Congress
had neither interfered with the power of the tribal courts nor given judicial jurisdiction to the states.
See id. at 221-23.
55. See id. at 223.
56. Id. at 220.
57. The Court focused on the locus of the cause of action and the status of the defendant. "It
is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with
an Indian took place there." Id. at 223. Nonetheless, the clear implication of the case is that because




jurisdiction is proper as a matter of federal law." It may also raise the
issue of whether tribal court jurisdiction over the nonmember is proper
as a matter of tribal law, depending upon the wording and reach of tribal
constitutional provisions and statutes.59 In addition, the case may raise
the issue of whether tribal legislative or executive power over the
nonmember party is proper as a matter of federal law.6" And finally, the
case may raise the tribal law issues inherent in the application of tribal
constitutional provisions, statutes, common law, and custom to the
resolution of the dispute.
When a federal court on post-exhaustion review fails to conscientiously
distinguish between these issues of federal law and tribal law, the result
is not only doctrinal confusion but serious encroachment upon the proper
role of the tribal courts. The prime example is Arizona Public Service
Co. v. Aspaas,6 in which the federal court said it was deciding a federal
question but in fact relitigated an issue already decided under tribal law.62
The substantive issue in Aspaas was whether the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act (NPEA) applied to a lessee's power plant located on
tribal trust land.63 The lessee, Arizona Public Service, claimed that the
Navajo Nation had waived its right to regulate employment at the plant
under the express terms of the lease documents.64 The Navajo Labor
Relations Board ruled against the lessee, and the Navajo Supreme Court
affirmed.65 On post-exhaustion review, the Navajo Nation argued that the
tribal courts had decided, as a matter of tribal law, the meaning of the
58. As noted, however, that federal question has been resolved in favor of tribal court
jurisdiction in lawsuits between members of the tribe and in Williams v. Lee-type adjudications. See
supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
59. Although most tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction, some tribes have jurisdictional
limits in their governing laws. See the discussion of Heinert v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 14 Indian L.
Rep. 3033 (D.S.D. 1985) and Twin City Construction Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians, 866 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1989) infra at text accompanying notes 111-22.
60. As noted earlier, the Court in A-] may have simplified this inquiry. See supra note 20.
Under the Court's ruling that a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction over a nonmember party is
coterminous with the tribe's legislative jurisdiction over that same person, the federal question
component of tribal court proceedings may have been compressed into a single inquiry.
61. 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).
62. See id. at 1129.
63. See id. at 1130.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1131 (citing Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17
Indian L. Rep. 6105 (Navajo 1990)). The Navajo Supreme Court decision addressed two major
issues. First, the court held that the Navajo Nation retained the sovereign power to regulate
employment practices. See Arizona Pub. Serv., 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6106-11. Second, the court
ruled that the Navajo Labor Relations Board properly interpreted Navajo statutes to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status. See id. at 6111-13. The Navajo Supreme Court thus dealt
with both federal law and tribal law questions.
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lease terms between the tribe and its lessee.66 The federal court, however,
expressly rejected the tribe's assertion and stated instead that the issue
was the extent to which a tribe "can apply tribal law to regulate the
activities of a non-Indian." '6 And that issue, the court held, was a federal
question within the jurisdiction of the federal court.68
The primary problem with the court's approach is that its statement of
the federal question issue did not reflect the issue it actually decided.
The precise issue the federal court decided was "whether the Navajo
Nation has agreed to a valid waiver of such a right" to regulate the
lessee's employment practices. 69  The court thus transformed a simple
contract interpretation issue--whether the lease documents contained a
clear waiver-into a question of federal law.
That transformation of a tribal law issue into a federal law issue has
three possible explanations. The first, that federal approval of the lease
documents transformed any interpretation of those documents into a
federal law issue, was partially rejected by the federal court itself.7" The
Navajo Nation pointed to existing Ninth Circuit precedent that federal
approval of a lease does not create federal jurisdiction." Although the
Aspaas court did not overrule its existing caselaw, it distinguished its
prior case as involving a "distinctly tribal issue," whereas the current
dispute did "not concern tribal self-governance."7 Accordingly, it found
the federal nature of the lease "highly probative," but not dispositive of
the federal question issue.73
66. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1132-33. Because the issue was one of"tribal contract law" already
addressed by the Navajo courts, the tribe contended that the federal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to relitigate the lessee's claim. Id. at 1132.
67. Id. at 1131; see also Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1461 (D. Nev. 1996) (noting that
a federal court defers to determinations of tribal law "unless they implicate substantial federal
questions").
68. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1134. Part IV.B. of this Article addresses the legitimacy of federal
courts, on post-exhaustion review, reaching the merits of the tribal court's decision.
69. Id.
70. The Secretary of the Interior approved the lease documents. See id. at 1130.
71. See id at 1133 (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965)).
72. Id. The court's assertion that the applicability of tribal law to a lessee of tribal trust land
"does not concern tribal self-governance" is extraordinary. Id. The Supreme Court has time and time
again, including at least one case involving the Navajo Nation, affirmed the inherent right of Indian
tribes to regulate lessees of their lands. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). As the Court expressly
noted in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981): "A tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."
73. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1133.
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A second possible explanation is that the federal court believed the
situation in Aspaas paralleled that in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,74
because in both cases the tribe imposed on a non-Indian lessee a tribal
law enacted after the lease was approved.75 But the parallel does not
hold. In Merrion, the issue was whether an Indian tribe retains its
regulatory authority over non-Indian lessees of tribal lands or whether the
lease terms govern the totality of the relationship.76 The Supreme Court
held that tribes retain their sovereign power to regulate lessees even after
the tribe had entered into the lease." But in Aspaas, as noted above, the
question of the Navajo Nation's authority to enact the NPEA and apply
it to lessees of tribal lands was not at issue. The question decided by the
federal court, rather, was whether the lease contained a clear waiver of
the tribe's right to apply the NPEA to that particular lessee.78 In fact, the
Aspaas court expressly declined to rule on "the Navajo Nation's inherent
power to regulate employment relations of a non-Indian employer and
Indian employees"--the Merrion issue-because it found "the dispositive
question in this case" was whether the lease documents contained a
waiver.79
The third possible explanation is more unprincipled, even if more
likely and perhaps more understandable. The federal court in Aspaas
obviously believed that the tribal court was simply and willfully wrong
in its interpretation of the lease terms.8" But the federal court could only
"correct" the tribal court, without doing violence to the established
standard of review,8" if it transformed the issue into one of federal law.
That explanation, however, leaves federal courts able to defer to tribal
determinations of tribal law only when the federal court agrees with the
tribal court determination. When the federal court disagrees, it can create
a federal question to review de novo. And that is no deference at all.
The Aspaas approach thus undermines every reason for the develop-
ment and protection of the tribal courts. It reduces the tribal courts to
74. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
75. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 135-37;Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1131.
76. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147-48.
77. See id. at 144-45. The contrary argument, the Court noted, confused the tribe's dual roles
as mineral owner and as government. See id. at 145. An Indian tribe does not abandon its sovereign
powers by failing to reserve them in a commercial contract, and the lessees thus remain subject to
subsequent governmental action such as the levy of severance taxes in Merrion. See id. at 146-47.
78. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1134-35.
79. Id. at 1134. The court assumed for purposes of its decision that such tribal authority did
exist. See id. Under Merrion, the tribal authority to regulate lessees of tribal lands appears well-
established. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144. The Aspaas court's waffling on the issue is therefore
puzzling.
80. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1134-35.
81. See infra Part Ill.
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little more than factfinders for the federal courts on post-exhaustion
review. It discourages tribal courts from interpreting and creating a
distinct body of tribal law. And it treats tribal court decisions as all but
irrelevant if the federal court disagrees with the outcome.
Federal courts must do a better job of differentiating between tribal law
and federal law than the Ninth Circuit did in Aspaas. In particular,
federal courts must resist the temptation to turn tribal law issues into
federal questions when they disagree with the tribal court's ruling on
tribal law. Without that restraint, tribal court jurisprudence cannot
prosper. Without the willingness of the federal courts to meticulously
distinguish between tribal law and federal law, the "process of coloniza-
tion" will indeed be complete. 2
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As noted, the tribal exhaustion doctrine contemplates some level of
federal court review. 3 Tribal court decisions are thus not treated like
state court decisions in cases where federal courts abstain in favor of state
courts. As Professor Clinton explains:
If a state court had ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a
controversy, the question might be reviewed on direct appeal to the
United States Supreme Court if the alleged subject matter jurisdiction
defect raised a federal question. Since the final judgment would be
accorded full faith and credit, there would be absolutely no possibility of
initiating a new action in federal court to attack that ruling. 4
The same is not true of tribal court decisions. A dissatisfied litigant may
go to federal district court to seek review at least of the question whether
the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper under federal law. 5
To that extent, then, the federal district courts act as appellate courts for
tribal judicial decisions.
82. See Pommersheim, supra note 31, at 420.
83. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57
(1995).
84. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 AK. L. REV. 77, 150 (1993).
Some scholars call for a similar approach to tribal court decisions: review only on a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that certiorari review most
respects tribal sovereignty. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26
WILLAMErrE L. REV. 841, 893 (1990); Reynolds, supra note 22, at 601. Others argue for the
elimination of Supreme Court jurisdiction over Indian law cases, presumably including review of
tribal court decisions, and the creation of a federal Indian Court of Appeals. See Michael C. Blumm
& Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court
Jurisdiction over Indian Cases, 46 ARK. L. REv. 203, 232 (1993).
85. Part IV, infra, explores the scope of the federal courts' review power.
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At the same time, however, the exhaustion doctrine also contemplates
some level of federal court deference to tribal court decisions. The Court
in Iowa Mutual spoke of "proper deference to the tribal court system. ' 6
In National Farmers, the Court noted that one reason for the exhaustion
doctrine was to allow tribal courts to "provide other courts with the
benefit of their expertise.""7 The Court thus could not have intended
federal courts to ignore tribal court rulings and simply hear post-
exhaustion cases anew.
In response to the paradoxical demands for both "proper deference"
and review, a consensus has begun to emerge in the federal courts
regarding the appropriate standard of review for tribal court decisions.
Based largely on the leading case of FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,8
federal courts have adopted a three-part approach to post-exhaustion
review. In descending order of deference, federal courts apply different
standards of review to tribal court determinations of tribal law, facts, and
federal law. 9
The standard of review for tribal law questions is full deference, for
findings of fact, slightly less deference, and for federal law questions, no
deference at all.9" Although the latter two standards are subject to the
well-deserved criticisms that they avoid traditional rules of finality of
judgments9' and wrest from tribes the authority to fully determine the
governing law in tribal courts,92 they now appear well-established in
federal court jurisprudence.
A. Tribal Court Determinations of Tribal Law
The highest degree of federal court deference is given to tribal court
determinations on questions of tribal law. "[B]ecause tribal courts are
best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law,"93 the general standard in
the lower courts is that tribal court interpretations of tribal law are "bind-
86. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
87. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
88. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. In so doing, the federal courts presume that all tribal court determinations fall within one
category or another. No federal court has addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review
for mixed questions of law and fact. Professor Skibine has argued that federal courts should apply
the same standard of review given to federal agency determinations: whether the tribal court's ruling
on mixed questions is reasonable or rational. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal
Courts 'Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between
Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 218-21 (1994).
90. See infra notes 93-97, 133-37, 151-56 and accompanying text.
91. See Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 84, at 880.
92. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 96.
93. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
1998]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
ing" on the federal courts.94 In City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe,95 for example, the appellees alleged the tribal court did not
have authority under the tribal constitution to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over them.96 The tribal courts, however, interpreted the tribal
constitution to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and the Eighth
Circuit held that "we defer to the tribal courts' interpretation" of tribal
laws.9" 'The court specifically noted that the standard of review is
unaffected by the fact that the tribal law applies to non-Indians.9" Tribal
court determinations of tribal law thus are binding on federal courts
whether tribal law is interpreted relative to tribal members, nonmember
Indians, or non-Indians.
The standard of absolute deference to tribal court rulings on tribal law
is fully consistent with the policies articulated in National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual. In both cases, the Supreme Court relied upon the
congressional commitment to tribal self-government and self-determina-
tion.99 In Iowa Mutual, the Court stated that tribal courts are "vital" to
the exercise of tribal self-govemment,0° noting specifically that the
exercise of federal jurisdiction "over matters relating to reservation
affairs" may adversely affect the role of tribal courts in furthering tribal
sovereignty."'
Moreover, in counseling deference to rulings on tribal law, the Court
did not create new doctrine but adhered to a century-old principle. In
94. See Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp.
1455, 1464 (D. Nev. 1996). Other federal courts do not use the word "binding," but speak instead
of the necessity to defer to tribal court determinations of tribal law. See City of Timber Lake v.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Duncan Energy Co. v. Three
Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that "determinations of Tribal law
should be accorded more deference" than de novo review).
95. 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993).
96. See id. at 558-59. The appellees consisted of an American Legion club, a non-Indian
individual, and three South Dakota cities, all of which operated liquor establishments on fee lands
within the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. See id.
97. Id. at 559; see also Hicks, 944 F. Supp. at 1461 (deferring to the ruling of the Intertribal
Court of Appeals that service of process on a non-Indian, off-reservation defendant was proper under
tribal law).
98. See City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559. This is consistent with Iowa Mutual. In lowa
Mutual, one of the parties to the tribal litigation was a non-Indian (the insurance company), and yet
the Court clearly contemplated that tribal law would apply in the resolution of the tribal lawsuit. See
Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that
jurisdiction over a non-Indian, who operates a store on an Indian reservation pursuant to federal
statute, lies in the tribal court, not the state court).
99. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14-15; National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
100. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14.
101. Id. at 15; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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Talton v. Mayes,"°2 a defendant in a Cherokee court challenged his
indictment on the ground that his grand jury was empaneled under a
repealed tribal law.' °3 He was indicted in December 1892 by a grand
jury of five persons as provided by a May 1892 tribal law, even though
a November 1892 law, which did not expressly repeal the May law,
provided for grand juries of thirteen persons. 4 The Court explicitly held
that interpretations of tribal law-including such questions as whether one
tribal statute repealed another or "what was the existing law of the
Cherokee nation"--are "solely matters within the jurisdiction of the courts
of that nation.' ' °5 The Court endorsed this principle again in 1959, when
it ruled that adjudication in a nontribal forum of a claim against a tribal
defendant arising in Indian country would infringe on the right of tribes
"to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'
06
Nonetheless, the lower federal courts have not always adhered to the
standard of deference to tribal court interpretations of tribal law. In two
cases within the Eighth Circuit, non-Indian tribal court defendants
challenged the tribal courts' exercise ofjurisdiction over them.' 7 In each
case, the tribal laws provided for tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants who consented to litigation in the tribal courts.' In each
case, the tribal courts interpreted the tribal laws to extend tribal court
jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendants, even though the defendants
had not consented to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. 9 And in each
case, the federal district courts overturned the tribal court interpretations
of tribal statutes and constitutional provisions delineating the reach of
tribal court jurisdiction.'
102. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
103. See id. at 379. The case is more famous, of course, for the defendant's contention that his
grand jury was constituted in a manner not consistent with the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process, and for the Court's holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the Cherokee
Nation. See id. at 384-85.
104. See id. at 378.
105. Id. at 385.
106. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
107. See Duncan Energy Co. v. Three.Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994); City
of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir. 1993).
108. See Duncan, 27 F.3d at 1296; City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559.
109. See Duncan, 27 F.3d at 1296; City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559. Although the plain
language of the statutes in the two cases seems to bar tribal court jurisdiction, other considerations
could lead tribal courts to a different result. For example, language purporting to limit tribal court
jurisdiction inserted in tribal constitutions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs rather than by the tribe
itself "'ought not be given the force or respect of law."' Pommersheim, supra note 31, at 430
(quoting Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051, 6053 (Chey. Riv. Sioux Ct. App. 1991)).
Therefore, as Professor Pommersheim notes, tribal courts can legitimately "identifly] and correcto"
the colonialist legacy remaining in tribal statutes and constitutions. Id
110. See Duncan, 27 F.3d at 1295-96; City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559.
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In Heinert v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,"' the non-Indian federal plaintiffs
argued that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over them under the tribal
constitution and statutes." 2  The tribal court denied their attempt to
appear specially to challenge jurisdiction, the tribal appellate court
affirmed, and the non-Indians filed suit in federal court to enjoin the
tribal court proceedings." 3  The federal court engaged in de novo
interpretation of the tribal laws, finding that statements in tribal statutes
and the constitution that non-Indians must consent to jurisdiction deprived
the tribal courts of jurisdiction in this case over the non-Indians, none of
whom had consented." 4 The federal court noted that the tribe had
declined to brief the merits of the federal court action, and thus "this
court is simply without the benefit of their input on the issues in this
case.""' 5 But the tribal court had given its input; by requiring the non-
Indians to appear in tribal court, it had interpreted the Oglala laws to
permit that exercise of jurisdiction. It may have declined to file a brief
in federal court precisely because its ruling on tribal law should have
been dispositive. Nonetheless, the federal district court engaged in its
own interpretation, without ever explaining why the interpretation of
tribal law created a federal question." 6
The Eighth Circuit subsequently engaged in similar error in the Twin
City cases. 1 7 A Turtle Mountain Chippewa statute, like the Oglala laws
at issue in Heinert, provided for judicial jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants who submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts.' The tribal
court held that the Twin City Construction Company had not submitted
itself to tribal jurisdiction, but the tribal appellate court reversed, and
Twin City sought an injunction in federal court." 9 The federal district
court ruled that Twin City had not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the tribe "within the meaning of the tribal code,"'2 and a divided en banc
111. 14 Indian L. Rep. 3033 (D.S.D. 1985).
112. See id. at 3034. The federal plaintiffs consisted of an electric association and its officers
and directors. See id. at 3033.
113. See id. at 3034.
114. See id. at 3034-35.
115. Id. at 3034.
116. See id. The court stated that it had federal question jurisdiction over the action under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. See id. at 3034. But the only issue raised or resolved in the federal court was the
interpretation of the Oglala laws. Considerable authority supports the proposition that the interpreta-
tion of tribal law does not raise a federal question. See supra Part II.
117. See Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 911 F.2d 137
(8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Twin City 11]; Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians, 866 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Twin City ].
118. See Twin City ll, 911 F.2d at 138.
119. See id.
120. See id. The en banc decision in Twin City I does not explain its reasoning, and the district
court opinion was not published.
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Eighth Circuit affirmed in Twin City 121 While the federal lawsuit was
pending, the tribe amended its statutes to provide for jurisdiction in cases
such as the Twin City litigation; the amendment provided that it applied
to pending cases.' On a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the
Eighth Circuit in Twin City H dissolved the injunction against proceed-
ings in tribal court on the ground that the basis for the injunction no
longer existed.'23
Both Heinert and the Twin City cases predated the development of the
"binding" standard for post-exhaustion review of tribal law determina-
tions."' Moreover, more recent Eighth Circuit decisions deferred to the
tribal courts' interpretations of tribal law. 2 One of the recent decisions
was City of Timber Lake, in which the court deferred to the tribal court's
interpretation of the tribal constitution as extending tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction over the non-Indian appellees.'26 The Eighth Circuit thus
seems to have rejected its approach in the Twin City cases not only in
theory, but also in a factual situation nearly identical to that in Twin City.
While it is therefore unlikely that the direct interpretation of tribal law
contrary to tribal court rulings would occur today,127 courts may nonethe-
less attempt to avoid deference by redefining the issue before them. In
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas,'28 for example, the federal court
reserved for itself the determination of whether a tribal court decision
involved tribal or federal law.'29 By transforming an issue of lease
interpretation under tribal law into an issue of tribal governmental
authority under federal law, the Aspaas court avoided any need to defer
to the tribal court's determinations.
121. See Twin City 1, 866 F.2d at 972.
122. See Twin City 1l, 911 F.2d at 139.
123. See id. at 139-40. The Eighth Circuit thus twice engaged in its own interpretation of tribal
law: in the first instance contrary to the highest tribal court's interpretation and in the second
instance before any tribal court could rule on the meaning of the amended tribal law. The fact that
the second federal interpretation protected tribal jurisdiction makes it no less intrusive than the first.
124. The standard certainly existed in the law at the time Twin City 1, Twin City Hl, and Heinert
were decided. See Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). But in the post-
exhaustion context, the standard that tribal court rulings on tribal law are binding on the federal
courts surfaced in the mid-1990s. See cases cited supra note 94.
125. See Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994); City
of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 1993).
126. See City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98 for
discussion of City of Timber Lake.
127. As one commentator notes, "it is a pure contradiction in terms for a federal court to declare
that tribal law is not precisely what the tribe's high court announces." Joranko, supra note 21, at
298.
128. 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).




Aspaas has obvious factors in common with Heinert and Twin City L
In each case the tribal court applied tribal law: in Aspaas, it was the
tribal common law of contract; 30 in Heinert and Twin City I, it was the
tribal statutory and constitutional law of judicial jurisdiction.' In each
case the tribal court engaged in an interpretation of tribal law that the
federal court manifestly thought was wrong.' And thus in each case, the
federal court ignored the doctrine of deference to tribal decision-making
and tribal determination of tribal law, and substituted its own "correct"
interpretation of the law. In Heinert and Twin City I, the arrogation of
power to the federal courts was overt. There was no pretense of
deference. Aspaas, on the other hand, the only one of the three cases
decided after the establishment of the post-exhaustion review standard of
"binding," took a more subtle approach. In that case, the federal court
bypassed the issue and hid the real agenda by defining the issue as one
of federal rather than tribal law.
Aspaas is thus the more dangerous decision. There is no indication
that federal courts today would follow the approach in Heinert and Twin
City I of engaging in wholesale reinterpretation of tribal law in post-
exhaustion review cases. But Aspaas opens the door to the same result:
redefine the tribal law issue as one of federal law and all necessity to
defer to the tribal court decision disappears. Under Aspaas, federal courts
may thus engage in substantial de novo interpretation of tribal law while
appearing to adhere to the articulated standard that tribal rulings on tribal
law are binding on the federal courts.
130. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1134.
131. See Twin City 1, 866 F.2d at 971; Heinert v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 14 Indian L. Rep. 3033,
3034-35 (D.S.D. 1985).
132. In a recent article, Professor Getches argues that the Supreme Court has abandoned
foundationalist principles of federal Indian law in a substantial number of cases impacting non-Indian
interests and substituted a subjectivist approach. See generally David H. Getches, Conquering the
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1573 (1996). "These judicial attempts to anticipate and alleviate cultural conflict have succeeded in
curbing the authority of tribal institutions whose actions appear to encroach upon the property
interests or values of non-Indians." Id. at 1594.
Although Professor Getches was speaking of the Supreme Court, his insights may also explain
the decisions in Aspaas, Heinert, and Twin City 1. Rather than adhere to the foundationalist principle
of deference to tribal courts on tribal law laid down from Talton through National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual, the federal courts engaged in a subjectivist approach designed to protect the non-Indian
cultural values and norms. The federal courts believed that the tribal courts reached the "wrong"
decisions on the tribal law, and that those wrong decisions too greatly impacted the non-Indian
litigants' rights. And so the foundationalist principle was abandoned in order to reach a result the
federal courts perceived, subjectively if sincerely, as "correct."
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B. Tribal Court Findings of Fact
Tribal court findings of fact are reviewed by federal courts for clear
error.' In the leading case of FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,'34 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that a clearly erroneous standard would further one
of the policies behind the exhaustion rule: "the orderly administration of
justice in the federal court."' Adherence to this policy, the court
explained, requires that tribal courts develop the factual record and that
federal courts, in turn, "respect[] the factfinding ability of the court of
first instance."'36  Moreover, the court noted, the clearly erroneous
standard implements the rule, developed in National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual, that "federal courts must show some deference" to tribal court
determinations.'
In addition, the clear error standard complies in part, if only in part,
with the Court's admonition in Iowa Mutual that unless a tribal court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit, the federal court should not
relitigate the merits.' By restricting their review of factual matters to
clear error, the federal courts refrain from, for example, conducting new
trials, second-guessing tribal juries, determining the credibility of
witnesses or the weight of the evidence, or deciding jurisdictional facts.'39
The standard of review helps ensure that federal courts act more as
appellate review panels for federal questions than as trial courts looking
anew at the lawsuit.
Finally, the clear error standard helps ensure federal court deference to
tribal court determinations of tribal law. 4° It would be anomalous if a
federal court could redetermine the factual underpinnings of a lawsuit, but
was required to defer to the tribal court on tribal law. For example,
suppose a tribal court in a tort case found the defendant careless and
therefore liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Suppose further that the legal
133. See FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990). Relying on
FMC, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the identical standard. See Mustang Prod. Co. v.
Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997); Duncan Energy
Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994).
134. '905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
135. Id. at 1313 (quoting National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 856 (1985)).
136. Id.
137. See id. The court believed, however, that this policy of deference should extend only to
tribal factfinding and not to tribal court determinations of federal law. See id. (noting that the proper
review on federal questions is de novo); see also infra text accompanying notes 151-58.
138. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987).
139. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 75 F.3d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996)
(explaining that a district court's underlying factual findings on jurisdictional issues are accepted
unless clearly erroneous).
140. See supra Part II1.A.
1998]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
holding was based on the tribal court's assessment of the parties' relative
credibility: it found the plaintiff's version of the facts credible and the
defendant's not credible. If the federal court could review the factual
findings of the tribal court de novo, it could conceivably find the
defendant's version more credible. Nonetheless, the federal court would
be required to defer to the tribal court's ruling on liability, even though
it rejected the factual basis for that conclusion of law.
The clearly erroneous standard adopted by the federal courts minimizes
the potential for such incongruous outcomes, although it does not avoid
them altogether. To truly defer to tribal courts, promote tribal court
expertise and factfinding, and eliminate conflicts, the federal courts must
adopt a standard that tribal court findings of fact, like tribal court
determinations of tribal law, are binding on post-exhaustion review. 4'
Nonetheless, the only federal court to suggest that tribal findings of fact
are binding used that standard as a basis to reject tribal court exhaus-
tion. "'
In Vance v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc.,"' the court refused to require the
plaintiff to exhaust tribal court remedies."' In so holding, the court
stated that if exhaustion were required, any factual issues determined by
the tribal court could not be challenged in a post-exhaustion federal
proceeding. 4 ' That in turn would lead to piecemeal litigation: the
federal court could review questions of federal law, but would be bound
by the tribal court's factual determinations. 46 Although the fear of
piecemeal litigation was only one factor in the federal court's refusal to
order exhaustion in Vance, 47 the court misperceived the entire basis of
the tribal exhaustion doctrine. That doctrine is not intended to avoid
141. See Joranko, supra note 21, at 299-306 (strongly advocating this approach).
142. See Vance v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
143. 923 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
144. See id. at911.





piecemeal litigation, 48 but to protect the integrity of tribal courts and
their "vital role" in tribal self-government.1
49
The decision in Vance has less to do with the proper standard of
federal court review of tribal court findings of fact than it does with the
court's obvious hostility to the exhaustion doctrine. Nonetheless, the
Vance decision serves as a reverse illustration of Professor
Pommersheim's paradoxes: o because of its fear that it would not be able
to review the tribal court's findings, the federal court refused to recognize
the proper role of the tribal court under the exhaustion doctrine.
C. Tribal Court Determinations of Federal Law
On post-exhaustion review, federal courts will review tribal court
rulings on federal law de novo.' This standard, announced in the
leading Ninth Circuit case of FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,'52 has
been expressly adopted by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits as well."'
Moreover, the Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned the de novo standard
of review in its only post-exhaustion opinion. Without stating a standard
of review, the Court in Strate v. A-] Contractors5 4 engaged in de novo
review of the federal law issues raised by the tribal court's assumption of
jurisdiction.' Similarly, a number of lower federal courts within the
148. The court in Vance took the piecemeal litigation factor from the standards for Colorado
River abstention, which courts use to determine whether a federal court should stay proceedings when
a parallel state court proceeding is pending. See Vance, 923 F. Supp. at 911 (citing Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). The discussion of Colorado River
abstention factors in Vance and the court's use of those factors to avoid tribal court exhaustion, see
Vance, 923 F. Supp. at 912-13, illustrate the dangers of importing state abstention law into the tribal
exhaustion doctrine. Cf Lynn H. Slade, Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing
National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in the Federal Courts, 71 N.D.
L. REv. 519 (1995) (arguing that federal-state abstention principles should be applied in the federal-
tribal context).
149. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987); see also National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
150. The paradoxes involve the federal courts' insistence on greater review powers as they
recognize an increased role for tribal courts. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 95-96; see also
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshotfrom the Field, 21 VT. L. REv. 7, 19-
20 (1996) ("[Y]ou're nobody until you're somebody.").
151. See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990).
152. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990); accord Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1464 (D. Nev.
1996).
153. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1288 (1997); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir.
1994).
154. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
155. See id.
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Eighth and Ninth Circuits have simply used a de novo approach without
articulating a standard of review.) 6
The reasoning in FMC for the adoption of a de novo standard was
sparse. Rejecting the tribes' proposed standards of clearly erroneous or
arbitrary and capricious,'57 the court offered two reasons for choosing de
novo review:
As to legal questions, the [National] Farmers Union Court stated that
the fact that a tribal court reviews a question first is helpful because other
courts might "benefit [from] their expertise." This indicates that federal
courts have no obligation to follow that expertise, but need only be
guided by it. Moreover, federal courts are the final arbiters of federal
law, and the question of tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question.
Federal legal questions should therefore be reviewed de novo.' 5
Neither explanation is satisfactory. First, the FMC court stated that
federal courts should be "guided" by tribal court rulings on federal law.'59
But a de novo standard that not only permits, but requires, federal courts
to decide federal questions anew does not allow for guidance. On post-
exhaustion review under a de novo standard, federal courts may agree
with tribal courts on federal questions, but tribal court expertise and
guidance are not part of the federal court's analysis.
Second, the FMC court noted that "federal courts are the final arbiters
of federal law."' 60  Although technically correct, that statement is
overbroad. Basic federalism principles provide that state courts cannot
interpret federal law inconsistently with the interpretations offered by the
federal courts. 6 ' Similarly, the plenary power doctrine of federal Indian
156. See, e.g., Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169,1170-71 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997); City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 559 (8th
Cir. 1993); Montana v. Gilham, 932 F. Supp. 1215, 1218-19 (D. Mont. 1996).
157. See FMC, 905 F.3d at 1313.
158. Id. at 1313-14 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
159. See id. at 1314.
160. Id.
161. State courts do not always pay attention to this rule, especially in Indian law cases. In the
Pacific Northwest fishing rights litigation, for example, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that
state agencies could not comply with a federal court order issued to protect tribal treaty rights to fish.
See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373,
1387-88 (Wash. 1977), vacated by Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151, 1157
(Wash. 1977), vacated by Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), the Supreme Court not only validated the federal courts'
interpretation of the treaties, but was also at pains "to remove any doubts about the federal court's
power to enforce its orders." Id. at 674.
More recently, however, the Supreme Court of the United States rewarded a state court for
ignoring a federal court decision on the identical issue. In Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087,
1093 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), the federal court ruled that the town of
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law provides that tribal courts are subject to the same constraint.6
Litigants in state court who believe the state court improperly interpreted
federal law can seek review in the Supreme Court. In that sense,
certainly, federal courts serve as the "final arbiters" of federal questions.
But litigants in state court do not have a right to seek review of the state
court decision in the lower federal courts. Unless the Supreme Court
grants review, the state ruling on federal law stands. Federal district
courts are not empowered to review every state court ruling on federal
law. But under the de novo standard, federal district courts are potential-
ly empowered to review every tribal court ruling on federal law. Federal
courts thus act as "final arbiters" of federal questions to a far greater
extent when those federal questions are decided by tribal, rather than
state, courts.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine federal judges voluntarily giving
up the right to determine federal questions de novo. When the Supreme
Court does review a state court's determination of federal law, it does so
de novo. 163  When a federal appeals court reviews a federal district
court's ruling on a federal question, it does so de novo2 De novo
review on federal law issues previously determined by another court is
thus the only standard with which the federal courts are familiar and
comfortable. Given that the Supreme Court has authorized lower federal
court review of at least some federal questions decided by tribal courts,'65
Myton had not been disestablished from the Uintah Reservation. Subsequently, the Utah Supreme
Court held in the course of a criminal proceeding that the town had been disestablished. See State
v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 953 (Utah 1992). The Supreme Court sided with the state, refusing to
address the issue of collateral estoppel because the issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari.
See Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1994). Eyeing Utah's success, the state of South Dakota
recently tried the same end-run around a federal court decision holding that the Yankton Sioux
Reservation has not been disestablished. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. Waste
Management Dist., 99 F.3d 1439, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the reservation has not been
disestablished), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (June 9, 1997); State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 867
(S.D. 1997) (concluding that the reservation has been diminished). In light of Hagen, the fact that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari is not encouraging. For criticism of the Hagen decision, see
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Aiz. ST. L.J. 1, 38-43 (1995).
162. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 86.
163. See, e.g., Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965 (using de novo review of state court determination of
reservation diminishment); Washington State Commercial, 443 U.S. at 674 (using de novo review
of both state and federal court decisions on Indian treaty fishing rights).
164. See, e.g., Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1994).
165. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19(1987). See generally infra Part IV.B.2.
As previously noted, some scholars argue that tribal court decisions on federal law should be
reviewable only by the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of certiorari. See supra note




it is probably unrealistic to expect federal courts to defer to tribal courts
on those issues.
IV. EXTENT OF REVIEW
Once the federal courts determine the proper standard of review, they
are faced with a more complex issue: what exactly are the federal courts
entitled to review? When a case comes back into federal court on post-
exhaustion review, the federal court is clearly entitled to review the
federal question of the tribal court's jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. But
is the federal court also entitled to review other federal questions raised
by the case? Is the federal court entitled to review non-federal questions
if the case would be properly brought in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction? The Supreme Court, in establishing the exhaustion doctrine,
offered little coherent insight on these questions.
A. Review of Tribal Court Jurisdiction
The exhaustion doctrine created in National Farmers makes the issue
of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember litigants a federal question.'66
The Supreme Court stated that "whether a tribal court has exceeded the
lawful limits of its jurisdiction" is a question arising under federal law.'67
Despite that federal question jurisdiction, however, the Court required
exhaustion of tribal remedies "before such a claim may be entertained by
a federal court."'68  Two years later, Iowa Mutual clarified the post-
exhaustion review suggested by that statement. The Court expressly held
that a tribal court's determination of its jurisdiction may be challenged in
federal district court.'6 9 Thus, in the only post-exhaustion case to reach
166. As noted earlier, tribal judicial jurisdiction over nonmembers may also raise questions of
tribal law, such as the interpretation of tribal statutes and constitutional provisions. See supra notes
47-58 and accompanying text. A tribal court's determination of its jurisdiction as a matter of tribal
law raises no federal question. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988)
(determining whether tribal court had jurisdiction over divorce and custody action as a matter of
federal law, but holding itself bound by tribal court's ruling that tribal court had jurisdiction as a
matter of tribal law).
167. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985).
Professor Reynolds called this an "astonishingly broad definition of federal question jurisdiction."
Reynolds, supra note 22, at 599. She critiques it as "a jurisdictional bootstrap, creating federal
question jurisdiction for many disputes previously found to be outside the purview of the federal
courts." Reynolds, supra note 23, at 1135. As Part IV.B. demonstrates, however, federal court
jurisdiction under the exhaustion doctrine should not extend beyond traditional questions of federal
law.
168. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
169. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19. Actually, a tribal court's assumption of jurisdiction may
be challenged in federal court. In one case, the tribal court refused on the ground of tribal sovereign
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the Supreme Court, Strate v. A-] Contractors,70 the issue before the
federal courts was whether, under federal law, the tribal court had
jurisdiction to hear a tort suit between two non-Indian parties arising out
of a vehicle accident on a state highway passing through the reserva-
tion. '7
Under A-], the federal question of a tribal court's jurisdiction over a
lawsuit involving nonmembers' conduct on fee lands is controlled by the
decision in Montana v. United States.7 2 In Montana, the Court outlined
an approach to tribal regulatory jurisdiction nonmembers of the tribe
conducting activities on nonmember-owned fee lands within reserva-
tions. 73 Although tribes may exercise full regulatory authority over tribal
members and nonmembers on trust lands, the Court held that tribes are
generally divested of regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee
lands. 74  Nonetheless, the Court stated that tribes retain authority even
over nonmembers on fee lands in three situations: where Congress has
delegated authority to the tribes; where the nonmembers have entered into
"consensual relations with the tribe[s] or [their] members;" or where the
nonmember conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.' 75
Although scholars had long argued that a tribe's judicial authority over
nonmembers is broader than its regulatory authority, 76 the Court in A-1
collapsed the two conceptually distinct types ofjurisdiction into one. "As
to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction.', 77
immunity to take jurisdiction over a lawsuit. See Sulcer v. Davis, No. 92-6079, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3457, at *6-8 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 1993). The plaintiff alleged in federal court that the tribal
court improperly dismissed her lawsuit. See id. at *6. The federal court held that it could not review
the issue as a federal question because "[tihe tribal court did not exceed the lawful limits of its civil
subject matter jurisdiction but rather refused to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at *7-8.
170. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
171. See id. at 1405-06.
172. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). As noted previously, tribal court jurisdiction over tribal members
should not raise any federal question. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
173. The Montana approach to tribal regulatory jurisdiction has been severely criticized. See,
e.g., Royster, supra note 161, at 43-63. The application of that approach to tribal judicial jurisdiction
only worsens its impacts on tribal government.
174. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65.
175. Id. at 564-66.
176. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 ARItZ. L. REV. 329, 334-35 (1989) (explaining why "[tiribal legislative and judicial
jurisdiction are not the same thing").
177. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997). The common law rule announced
in A-I applies in the absence of congressional action. Thus, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115
F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997), the court held that although the Price Anderson Act "on its face provides
the sole remedy" for nuclear torts, the Act did not necessarily strip the tribal courts of jurisdiction
to adjudicate the nuclear tort claims of tribal members arising out of on-reservation injuries. Id. at
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Applying the Montana test to tribal court jurisdiction on post-ex-
haustion review, the Court held that the tribal court had no jurisdiction
to hear a personal injury action between two non-Indian parties arising
out of a traffic accident on a state highway within the reservation
borders. 78 Neither party had a consensual relationship with the tribe, 79
and the accident did not have a sufficient impact on tribal sovereign
interests because jurisdiction in the case was not "needed to preserve 'the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."""0  The Court, in other words, treated the lawsuit as a "common-
place state highway accident claim"'' between two non-Indians, having
no substantial relationship to tribal self-government. 2
Where even "commonplace" actions do present a sufficient nexus to
tribal interests, however, tribal jurisdiction should exist. In particular,
where one party to the lawsuit is a tribal member, tribal judicial
jurisdiction over the lawsuit is necessary to preserve the right of the tribe
to make and be governed by tribal law. As the Court held in Williams
v. Lee," 3 tribal courts must have judicial jurisdiction exclusive of state
courts to hear "commonplace" claims against defendants who are tribal
members in order to preserve tribal self-government. 4 If tribal court
jurisdiction does not also extend to lawsuits brought by tribal members
against nonmember defendants, then federal courts are encouraging a race
to the courthouse.'85 And that race, because it would make the decisional
law dependent on which party filed first, would undermine the right of
tribes "to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 6
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit recently held that tribal courts had no
subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by a member of the
tribe against a non-Indian for injuries arising out of a traffic accident on
a state highway within the boundaries of the reservation. 87  Seriously
1504-05. The federal court consequently upheld a stay of the federal case pending the exhaustion
of tribal remedies. See id. at 1509.
178. The Court held that a state highway right-of-way through the reservation was functionally
"land alienated to non-Indians." A-, 117 S. Ct. at 1414.
179. See id. at 1415.
180. Id. at 1416 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
181. Id.
182. In so doing, of course, the Court further undercut the territorial jurisdiction of tribal
governments. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based andMembership-Based Views
of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PiTr. L. REv. I (1993);
Royster, supra note 161.
183. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
184. See id. at 223 (collection action by non-Indian store owner for goods sold on credit to tribal
members within reservation borders).
185. See Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 634 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988).
186. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
187. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1997). Wilson was an action to
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misreading A-i, which concerned only state highway accidents between
two nonmembers of the tribe, 8' the court of appeals in Wilson v.
Marchington apparently found irrelevant the tribal membership of the
plaintiff. The court stated that the facts in Wilson were "almost
precisely" the same as those in A-i: "an automobile accident between
two individuals" on a state highway.s 9 But an automobile accident
between a member and a nonmember is not "almost precisely" the same
as one between two nonmembers; it is substantially different. If the
injured tribal member does not have a right to bring a suit in tribal court,
as the Ninth Circuit held, then the tribe has no right to "make its own
laws"'90 and apply them to its members.
In other cases, however, federal courts on post-exhaustion review have
upheld tribal court jurisdiction over lawsuits between member and
nonmember parties. Tribal court jurisdiction was affirmed, for example,
in a divorce and child custody proceeding where the member-nonmember
couple resided on the reservation during their marriage. 9' Similarly,
even under the Montana tests, tribal courts retain jurisdiction to hear tort
claims by a tribal member against state game wardens in their individual
capacities, arising from the execution of search warrants on allotted
land.'92 In Nevada v. Hicks,'93 the court found that the tribe had a
governmental interest in the execution of state search warrants within its
territory as well as an interest in providing its members with a forum in
which to vindicate their rights.'94
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently held that under the Montana
approach, tribal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit by a tribal
member against a county government. In Yellowstone County v. Pease,93
enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court. See id. at 807. The federal court held that although
tribal judgments are entitled to comity, see id. at 809, federal courts must not enforce tribal
judgments under the principle of comity if the tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the lawsuit. See id. at 810. The court then determined that under A-, the tribal court did not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate the lawsuit. See id. at 815.
188. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1407 (1997). The Court expressly noted
that a ruling on the consortium claim of the plaintiff's adult children, all of whom were members of
the tribe, was not at issue. See id. at 1408 & n.3.
189. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 814.
190. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)..
191. See Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
192. See Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1464-68 (D. Nev. 1996) (presently on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit).
193. 944 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Nev. 1996) (presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit).
194. See id. at 1466. The court noted that Montana was not necessarily the applicable test
because the nonmember actions were taken on allotted land belonging to a tribal member rather than
the fee lands for which the Montana test was developed. See id. Nonetheless, the court analyzed
tribal court jurisdiction under the Montana factors. See id. at 1466-67.
195. 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997).
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a Crow Indian brought suit in tribal court to enjoin the county from
imposing its ad valorem property tax on his fee land within the Crow
Reservation.'96 In an application of Montana remarkably short on
analysis, the court rejected Pease's argument that the potential loss of
land from foreclosure "could be devastating" to tribal governmental
interests.' 97 Pease's "speculation," the court held, did not establish a
"direct" effect on "the Tribe as a whole."'98 The court failed to explain
why the loss of land belonging to tribal citizens would not directly impact
tribal governmental interests.
One explanation for the crabbed reading in Pease was the court's use
of reformulations of the Montana test suggested by subsequent cases. 199
The court took the "as a whole" language from the court of appeals
decision in South Dakota v. Bourland,200 while failing to note that the
Supreme Court decision in Bourland did not employ that language but
merely quoted the Montana tests as written.2' The Pease court also
referenced Justice White's opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,2"2 which held that nonmember conduct
should have "demonstrably serious" impacts and "imperil" tribal interests
before tribes could retain jurisdiction.0 3 Again, however, the Pease court
failed to note that the Supreme Court's subsequent Bourland decision
returned to the language of Montana: that nonmember conduct must
"threaten[] or [have] some direct effect" on tribal governmental inter-
ests.2"4
196. See id. at 1170-71. In County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269-70
(1992), the Court held that states could tax Indian-owned fee land patented under the General
Allotment Act. See id. at 269-70. In the Pease litigation, the Crow Court of Appeal held that the
county had no authority to tax land allotted and patented pursuant to the Crow Allotment Act of 1920
rather than the General Allotment Act. See Pease, 96 F.3d at 117 1. For criticism of the County of
Yakima decision, see Royster, supra note 161, at 20-29.
197. See Pease, 96 F.3d at 1176; cf Royster, supra note 161, at 26 (arguing that tribes should
have exclusive jurisdiction over fee lands owned by tribal members).
198. Pease, 96 F.3d at 1176-77.
199. See id. at 1177.
200. 39 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 1994).
201. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695-96 (1993).
202. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
203. See id. at 43 1. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court as to tribal zoning authority
within the open area of the Yakama Reservation. See id. at 432-33. The Ninth Circuit again referred
to the Brendale language in Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1997). As in Pease,
the court in Wilson neglected the Supreme Court's apparent rejection of Justice White's rewrite of
the Montana test. See infra note 204.
204. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). Moreover, the Court in A-I also
quoted Montana directly, implicitly rejecting the language used by Justice White in Brendale. See
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997).
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The decision in Pease that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction thus
appears to rest on a restrictive reading of the Montana approach that the
Court itself has rejected. The Montana tests more properly should be
limited to the types of cases represented by Montana itself. First, the
tests should apply only to situations that occur on nonmember fee lands,
not on fee lands owned by members of the tribe.2"5 Second, the Montana
tests should be employed using the formulation from Montana itself, as
subsequent opinions of the Court have indicated. Finally and most
importantly, the federal courts must realize that one of the tribal
governmental powers that the Montana approach was designed to protect
was the power expressly recognized in Williams v. Lee:20 6 the right of
tribes "to make their own laws and be ruled by them."2 7  Montana
teaches that tribes retain jurisdiction over nonmembers in cases of direct
effects on tribal "political integrity,"2 8 and surely political integrity is
broad enough to encompass the integrity of the law-making and law-
applying institutions of tribal government.
Some aspects of post-exhaustion review of tribal court jurisdiction are
thus settled. Federal courts may in fact review tribal court jurisdiction as
a matter of federal law, and after A-], in cases involving nonmembers on
fee lands, that review is conducted under the Montana factors. Whether
tribal courts retain their vitality in cases involving nonmember parties will
now depend on the federal courts' willingness to recognize the impacts
of those cases on the integrity of tribal legal institutions.
B. Review on the Merits
Once the federal court has reviewed tribal court jurisdiction to decide
the case, may it continue and review the merits of the tribal court's
substantive law decision? Judges and scholars have noted the inconsis-
tencies of the Court's statements in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. °9
In National Farmers, the Court remarked that the exhaustion rule
provided tribal courts the opportunity to develop the record "before either
the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed." ' 0
205. As noted earlier, the Court in A-I held that a state highway was the equivalent of
nonmember fee lands and therefore subject to the Montana tests. See A-, 117 S. Ct. at 1414.
206. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
207. Id. at 220.
208. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
209. See Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1469 n.27 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[T]hose two opinions
seem to represent contradictory approaches to the question of post-exhaustion federal review of the
substantive legal issues going to the merits of the underlying litigation."); Reynolds, supra note 22,
at 562 n.126 ("The Supreme Court itself suggested two very different standards in its exhaustion
opinions.").
210. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
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Exhaustion also offered federal courts the benefit of tribal court expertise
"in the event of further judicial review." '' Although these statements
hardly constitute a clear mandate for federal court review of the merits,
they do arguably contemplate some federal court review beyond the
federal question of tribal court jurisdiction. Two years later in Iowa
Mutual, however, the Court asserted that federal courts may not review
the merits of tribal court decisions: "Unless a federal court determines
that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, . . . proper deference to the
tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by the [tribal
members'] bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts. 2' 2  In
contrast to National Farmers, then, Iowa Mutual appears to forbid federal
court review of the merits of a tribal court decision.
Yet the two Supreme Court statements can be reconciled by focusing
on the difference between federal law and tribal law. Any tribal court
litigant who seeks federal court review may raise one federal question:
the propriety of tribal court jurisdiction to hear the case. Once the
federal court has reviewed that decision, however, any further review is
on the merits. But in order for the federal court to even contemplate
review on the merits, the federal court must have an independent basis for
jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit. That means the underlying
lawsuit must be predicated on either federal question or diversity
jurisdiction for the federal court to have any authority to consider it.
This principle of federal court jurisdiction, then, leads to three avenues
for the federal courts to follow once the issue of tribal court jurisdiction
has been reviewed. These avenues depend on whether the merits raise no
issues within federal jurisdiction, are based on federal question jurisdic-
tion, or fall within the courts' diversity jurisdiction.
1. No Independent Basis of Federal Jurisdiction
In many situations, the underlying lawsuit does not rest on either
federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Although not post-exhaustion
review cases, a number of decisions have held that no federal jurisdiction
exists over non-diverse tort and contract actions involving Indians or
Indian tribes.2" 3 Thus if the federal court finds that the tribal court
211. Id. at 857.
212. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
213. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d
1376, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1988) (breach of lease claim by tribal member against tribe, even though
lease entered into under authority of federal law); Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. Apex Constr. Co.,
757 F.2d 221, 223 (10th Cir. 1985) (breach of contract claims by tribe against contractor for on-
reservation work); Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d
708, 714 (9th Cir. 1980) (breach of contract claim for negligent design and construction ofon-reser-
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properly had jurisdiction to hear the case, the only federal law issue has
been resolved and the federal court is without jurisdiction to determine
the merits of a non-diversity action.
Because post-exhaustion lawsuits in federal court raise at least one
federal question-that of tribal judicial authority-the ability of the
federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the nonfederal
claims is at issue. When a federal court has original jurisdiction in a
case, it also possesses supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution."2 4  Nonetheless, a federal court may decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction if "in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."2"' The
language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute itself thus provides two
reasons why federal district courts should not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over nonfederal issues in post-exhaustion cases.
First, the tribal law claims are not likely to be "so related" to the
federal questions that they form part of the same case or controversy.
Although federal courts may require "only a loose factual connection
between the claims" to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,21 6 there must
nonetheless be "a common nucleus of operative fact" for the claims to be
vation building); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479,481-82(10th Cir. 1975) (breach
of contract claim against construction company); Meeks v. McAdams, 390 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir.
1968) (wrongful death action arising from on-reservation accident involving only tribal members);
Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 499 F. Supp. 1317, 1322 (D. Ariz. 1980), af'd, 682 F.2d 1311 (9th
Cir. 1982) (personal injury action by tribal members against on-reservation employer); Blackfeet
Tribe v. Wippert, 442 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D. Mont. 1977) (action to enforce contract); Ware v.
Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (claim alleging substandard housing by tribal
member against tribal housing authority). Courts have adhered to this no-federal-jurisdiction rule
even when neither state nor tribal courts would have jurisdiction over the merits of the lawsuit.
Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 68-70 (8th Cir. 1974).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). The supplemental jurisdiction statute, enacted in 1990,
replaced the common law concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. See CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.1 (Supp. 1997).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). There are three other circumstances in which a federal court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: the claim presents a "novel or complex issue of State
law;" the claim "substantially predominates over" the claims otherwise within the federal court's
jurisdiction; and the claims within the district court's original jurisdiction have been dismissed. Id.
§ 1367(c)(1)-(3).
216. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 214, § 3567.1 n.41.
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tried together in one proceeding." 7 However, in most post-exhaustion
cases, the "common nucleus" of facts will be missing.
For example, consider an ordinary personal injury case. The deter-
mination of the tribal court's jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit shares few,
if any, facts with the decision as to which party is at fault for the
underlying tort. By the same token, the determination of a tribal court's
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to its authority to tax non-Indian
companies operating on the reservation would share little "common
nucleus" of fact with an assertion by the companies that the tribal tax
code's definition of a taxable entity does not apply to them.
Even where the tribal claims may be sufficiently factually related to the
federal law claims, however, there are "other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction."2 ' These reasons include tribal self-government,
the federal policy promoting it, and the tribal exhaustion doctrine that
helps implement that federal policy. The Supreme Court has noted the
"vital role" of tribal courts in the exercise of tribal self-government" 9 and
has counseled the federal courts to accord "proper deference" to the
decisions of the tribal courts.22° The lower federal courts have achieved
a consensus on how to show that deference. They review federal law
questions de novo, but give "binding" effect to tribal court rulings on
tribal law. If the federal courts could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over tribal law claims sufficiently factually related to the federal law
claims, all deference to tribal court rulings would disappear. By
permitting the federal courts to relitigate tribal law issues on post-
exhaustion review, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would negate
the doctrine and policies of tribal exhaustion.
Supplemental jurisdiction in these situations would also be thoroughly
inefficient because the federal courts would be relitigating claims already
decided by the tribal courts, which are the very courts "best qualified to
interpret and apply tribal law."22' Thus, supplemental jurisdiction over
nonfederal questions would put the federal courts "in direct competition
with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over
217. These factors determined the federal courts' pendentjurisdiction under the pre-supplemental
jurisdiction law. See generally United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
The Gibbs factors are, however, generally used under the supplemental jurisdiction statute to
determine whether claims are "so related" that the federal courts should exercise jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (Ist Cir. 1996).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 3567(c)(4). Federal courts should consider "judicial economy, convenience,
fairness and comity" in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Wright v.
Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).
219. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
220. See id. at 19.
221. Id. at 16 ("Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal
law-making because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.").
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reservation affairs." '222 That competition is precisely what the exhaustion
doctrine was created to avoid.
Federal courts thus should not assert supplemental jurisdiction over the
merits of a case heard in tribal court if the merits would not support
original jurisdiction in the federal district court. Once the federal court
upholds tribal court jurisdiction in a nonfederal, non-diverse action, any
further federal involvement should be restricted to action necessary to
enforce the tribal court judgment outside the reservation.
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In the second situation, the underlying lawsuit is premised on federal
question jurisdiction. As discussed in Part II, the issue of whether an
Indian tribe retains the sovereign authority to extend its laws to non-
members presents a question of federal law.223 Several courts have raised
and determined that federal question in the course of post-exhaustion
review."'
The cases reviewing on the merits the federal question of tribal
sovereign authority have followed a pattern. In no case has the federal
court reviewed the federal question of the tribal court's jurisdiction to
hear the case.22 Instead, the federal courts have gone directly to the
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 42.46 and accompanying text.
224. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, l17 S. Ct.
1288 (1997); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996); City of Timber Lake
v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905
F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
In addition to the federal question of tribal authority over nonmembers, lawsuits adjudicated in
tribal court may raise other issues arising under federal law. For example, issues arising out of
gaming contracts may implicate federal question jurisdiction under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act. See Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 406 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
225. In City of Timber Lake, the court rejected a challenge to the tribal court's personal
jurisdiction over the non-Indian parties on the ground that the federal court would defer to tribal
court rulings on tribal law. See City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 558-59. None of the federal cases
that reviewed the merits of federal questions, however, addressed the federal issue of the tribal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction.
Even though the federal courts have not ruled on tribal court jurisdiction in these cases, the
federal courts apparently believed that tribal judicial authority did exist in each case. In three of the
cases-Mustang Production, City of Timber Lake, and FMC-the federal courts of appeals agreed
with the tribal courts that the tribes had regulatory jurisdiction. See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1385;
City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at 559; FMC, 905 F.2d at 1314. Under the Court's recent decision in
A-I-that judicial jurisdiction is as broad as regulatory jurisdiction-the three circuit court opinions
necessarily upheld the jurisdiction of the tribal courts that ruled on the merits of the cases. See Strate
v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997). The fourth case, Aspaas, disagreed with the tribal
court's ruling on the merits, although there is no indication in the opinion that the Ninth Circuit
believed the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1134-35.
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federal questions raised by the merits of the lawsuit, reviewing tribal
court determinations de novo. In only one case has the federal court
offered any explanation as to why federal courts are authorized under the
National Farmers doctrine to review the merits of tribal court decisions
on federal law issues. In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas,"' the
court stated that the issue before it, "whether the Navajo Nation retained
its power to regulate the affairs of a non-Indian lessee, [is] a question
whose federal nature is the same in all material respects as the question
National Farmers posed in regard to property owners." '227  More
commonly the federal courts simply refer to their ability under National
Farmers to review federal questions of tribal "jurisdiction," without
differentiating between tribal court jurisdiction and tribal legislative or
regulatory jurisdiction.
The case of Mustang Production Co. v. Harrison22 is typical. A group
of oil companies challenged the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes' authority to
impose severance taxes on their production from allotments held in trust
for tribal members.2 The tribal courts ruled that the Tribes retained that
governmental authority, and the case came into federal court on post-
exhaustion review.230 The Tenth Circuit first stated the appropriate
standard of review: "[W]hen reviewing tribal court decisions on
jurisdictional issues," federal courts should review tribal courts'
determinations of federal law de novo.' The federal court then
identified the "jurisdictional issue" before it as whether the Tribes
retained jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction to tax non-Indian lessees--on
allotted lands.232 Because the merits involved a federal question of tribal
"jurisdiction," the federal court did not distinguish that issue from the
issue of the tribal court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the lawsuit.233
226. 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).
227. Id. at 1132; see also Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1302
(8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring) ("[Tiribal court jurisdiction is not at issue here-the tribal
court of course has jurisdiction to enforce a tribal tax or employment law. The federal question here
goes to the merits of the case-whether the Tribe has the sovereign power to enact the tax and
employment laws being enforced."); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 898 F.
Supp. 1549, 1559-60 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (expressly rejecting argument that federal court's federal-
question review is limited to tribal judicial power and does not include review of tribal regulatory
or legislative power).
228. 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
229. See id. at 1383.
230. See id. at 1383-84.
231. Id. at 1384 (emphasis added).
232. See id. at 1384-86.
233. See FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal
question was tribal jurisdiction to regulate employment at plant located on fee land within
reservation); see also City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 558 (8th
Cir. 1993) (federal question was whether Congress delegated authority to tribe to regulate liquor
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Post-exhaustion lawsuits of the Mustang Production type thus raise
questions of tribal legislative or regulatory authority, which the federal
courts will review de novo under federal question jurisdiction. Whether
the federal courts should review the merits of federal questions is
probably a moot issue; the fact is that the federal courts already do so.
Given the federal courts' insistence that they are the "final arbiters" of
federal law, federal judges will be loathe to avoid deciding any federal
questions inherent in the cases before them.234 Moreover, that approach
is arguably justified under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Strate v.
A-i Contractors that a tribe's judicial jurisdiction "does not exceed" its
legislative and regulatory jurisdiction. 235  After A-, if a federal court
determines on post-exhaustion review that the tribe properly exercised
regulatory jurisdiction, it has necessarily determined that the tribe's
judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate the lawsuit was also proper as a matter
of federal law.2
36
Post-exhaustion review cases that include federal questions on the
merits may also raise questions of tribal law. For example, assume that
Mustang Production challenged not only the tribes' sovereign authority
to tax its activities on trust allotments, but also a ruling of the tribal court
that Mustang Production came within the definition of a taxable entity
under the tribal tax code.237  That issue does not present a federal
question. It presents purely a tribal law question involving the proper
interpretation of a tribal statute. Because the federal courts defer to tribal
court decisions on tribal law, the federal court on post-exhaustion review
would not redetermine the statutory interpretation issue.23
As a matter of practice, then, the federal courts on post-exhaustion
review will redetermine de novo any federal questions raised by the
merits of the lawsuit, as well as the federal question of the tribal courts'
jurisdiction. However, the federal courts may not relitigate any tribal law
traffic on fee lands within reservation).
234. See FMC, 905 F.2d at 1314. Similar reasoning explains the federal courts' insistence on
de novo review of all federal questions decided by tribal courts. See supra text accompanying notes
225-33.
235. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
236. As noted earlier, in three of the four post-exhaustion cases in this category, the federal court
upheld tribal jurisdiction. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997); City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d at558;FMC, 905 F.2d at 1315.
In the fourth case, Aspaas, the court in fact redetermined the nonfederal question of whether the lease
documents contained a waiver of tribal regulatory authority, all the while maintaining that it
relitigated a federal question. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1132-35 (9th Cir.
1996). The Aspaas decision is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 61-81.
237. Note that Mustang Production did not raise this issue. The issue is discussed here solely
by way of illustration.
238. Nor should the federal courts take supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal-question
claims. See supra Part IV.B.I.
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questions that were decided as part of the same lawsuit in the tribal
courts. That difference in the review authority of the federal courts
requires those courts, as discussed previously, to scrupulously distinguish
between issues of federal law and issues of tribal law.239
3. Diversity Jurisdiction
In the third post-exhaustion review situation, the underlying lawsuit is
premised on diversity jurisdiction. The paradigm case is Iowa Mutual
itself. The insurance company filed suit in federal district court against
its insured and the injured employee seeking a ruling that it had no duty
to defend or indemnify its insured because the employee sustained the
injuries outside the scope of the insurance policy. 40 The federal lawsuit,
based on diversity, was intended to bypass a pending tribal court action
by the injured employee against the insured for compensation for injuries
and against the insurance company for bad faith refusal to settle.14' The
Supreme Court, of course, ordered Iowa Mutual to exhaust all available
tribal court remedies before it could request federal court review of the
tribal court's jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. 4 At that point, the Court
noted, unless the federal court determined that the Blackfeet courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claim against Iowa Mutual, "proper deference to
the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by the
[injured employee's] bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts. 2 43
The reason the federal courts are precluded from relitigating the merits
on post-exhaustion review is inherent in the type of lawsuit brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. In those cases, tribal law
determines the merits of the claims litigated in tribal court, and the
federal courts defer to tribal court determinations of tribal substantive
law. Although Justice Stevens was skeptical of that approach in Iowa
Mutual,2 44 in fact it is only logical.
A federal lawsuit premised on diversity jurisdiction has, by definition,
no federal law available to apply. A diversity case that involves an
Indian party that could not properly be heard in tribal court would likely
be determined according to state law. But a diversity case which is
properly heard in tribal court is not generally decided under state law, but
239. See supra Part 11.
240. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U:S. 9, 12-13 (1987).
241. See id. at 11-13.
242. See id. at 16-19. The Blackfeet Tribal Code did not authorize interlocutory appeals, and
so Iowa Mutual was required to litigate the merits in tribal court before seeking post-exhaustion
review of the tribal court's jurisdiction. See id. at 12.
243. Id. at 19.
244. See id. at 22 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring).
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under tribal law. The Court's recent decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors
makes that clear.245 In A-, the Court collapsed the questions of tribal
judicial and tribal legislative/regulatory authority over nonmembers,
holding that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its
legislative jurisdiction."246 In essence, then, after A-] a tribal court may
only hear cases involving nonmembers if the tribe possesses the sovereign
authority to apply its substantive law to those nonmember parties.247 If
the tribal courts may only adjudicate lawsuits in which the tribe possesses
legislative authority, then the tribal courts will necessarily be applying
tribal, not state, law to the non-federal issues raised.
Certainly tribal courts may refer to state law in their decisions. Like
the courts of sister states, tribal courts may borrow freely from state law
as they find appropriate,248 but the law that tribal courts apply is tribal,
not state, law.249 As a result, if the tribal court has jurisdiction, then the
substantive law determination is one of tribal law, and proper deference
to tribal court determinations of tribal law "precludes relitigation of issues
raised... and resolved in the Tribal Courts."25 The lower federal courts
have recognized this principle in the "binding" deference that they accord
tribal court decisions of tribal law on post-exhaustion review.25' Thus in
a diversity case, on post-exhaustion review, the federal courts do not
relitigate the merits because the merits involve questions of tribal law.252
Again, Iowa Mutual itself is a prime example. In tribal court, the
injured employee alleged that the insurance company had refused in bad
faith to settle.253 As an affirmative defense, the insurance company
asserted that its policy did not cover the injuries sustained.254 In litigating
245. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
246. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 170-82.
247. See A-, 117 S. Ct. at 1413.
248. Tribal codes, for example, may provide that in civil matters the laws of the surrounding
state may be used as a guide. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 85-86 (referencing the Tribal
Code of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe, ch. 33 § 1 (1982)); Peter B. Kutner, Can Federal Courts
Remain Open When State Courts Are Closed?: Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins on the Indian Reservation,
52 N.D. L. REV. 647, 680 n.259 (1976) (quoting the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Justice, §
2.1 (July 1973)).
249. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983)
("The tribe has chosen to adopt the framework of state law to cover gaps in the tribal code. In doing
so, however, it has not relinquished its own sovereignty, and it has not involved the state in any way
in the enforcement of interpretation of tribal law.").
The same principle applies to states. If Oklahoma uses Kansas law as a guide, it is not applying
Kansas law to the resolution of the issue but rather creating Oklahoma law to apply.
250. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
251. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
252. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.
253. See id. at i1.
254. See id. at 13 n.3.
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the merits of the lawsuit, the tribal court must decide the issue of bad
faith and interpret the terms of the insurance policy. Absent a choice of
law provision in the policy that would be binding on the tribal court, that
court would apply tribal law to the questions of bad faith and contract
interpretation. On post-exhaustion review, then, those tribal law
determinations of the tribal court should be binding on the federal courts.
The admonition of the Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual that federal
courts are precluded from relitigating the merits on post-exhaustion
review25 can thus be taken literally. Iowa Mutual was a diversity case,
and the Court's holding applies to post-exhaustion review of cases in
which the federal district court could exercise original jurisdiction over
the merits under its diversity jurisdiction. Any diversity case raising a
colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction should be sent to tribal court for
exhaustion of tribal remedies. In tribal court, the merits will be
determined according to tribal law, and on post-exhaustion review the
federal courts will be precluded from relitigating those tribal court
determinations of tribal law.256
255. See id. at 19.
256. This approach is not only consistent with the exhaustion doctrine and with proper respect
for tribal courts, but it avoids complex choice of law issues in the federal courts.
First, prior to Iowa Mutual, the federal courts split as to whether a federal court sitting in diversity
could hear a lawsuit when the state court could not because of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction.
Compare R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
diversity jurisdiction, like state court jurisdiction, would interfere with tribal self-government), with
Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27-28 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding diversity jurisdiction will not
interfere with any state policy). See generally Kutner, supra note 248 (arguing that federal courts
should retain diversity jurisdiction).
Second, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994), provides that in a non-federal-law
case, "[tihe laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id. As interpreted in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the "laws of the several states" include not only state statutes and
regulations, but also state common law. The difficulty with applying this doctrine on post-exhaustion
review is that the laws of the states do not apply; the laws of the tribes do. The Erie doctrine thus
seems inapplicable to diversity cases decided by tribal courts.
Third, even if the federal courts did redetermine the merits of diversity cases, should they apply
state law or tribal law? If the federal court uses state law, it undermines tribal self-government and
the role of tribal courts as well as the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. But if the federal court
applies tribal law, it should be bound by the decision on that law of the tribe's highest tribunal,
which means it should be bound by the tribal court's decision on the merits.
The exhaustion doctrine for diversity cases avoids these complicated questions. The question is
not whether federal courts may exercise their diversity jurisdiction when state courts cannot hear the
lawsuit (a question of subject matter jurisdiction), but rather whether the federal courts should abstain
in favor of tribal courts (a question of comity). See Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873
F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir. 1989); Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir.
1987). If the federal court sends the case to tribal court, the tribal court will rule on the merits. And




The contours of the federal courts' post-exhaustion review of tribal
court decisions are beginning to emerge. Federal courts will review tribal
court determinations of federal law de novo, but will accord total
deference to tribal court determinations of tribal law. In addition, the
federal courts will review any question of federal law that raises the issue
of tribal sovereign authority over nonmembers, whether that question
concerns a matter of the tribal court's authority to adjudicate the lawsuit
or of the tribe's authority to regulate or legislate.
Nonetheless, despite the broad review power this approach vests in the
federal courts, federal courts cannot review all cases on the merits. If the
merits of the lawsuit heard in tribal court have been determined under
tribal rather than federal law-as in cases in which the merits do not raise
a federal question-then the federal courts must defer to the tribal courts'
conclusions of law. Where the merits of a case have been decided by
tribal law, then federal courts are truly precluded from relitigating the
merits on post-exhaustion review.
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